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SDI AND THE LAWYERS: EVOLVING
INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMS
CONTROL ACCORDS
The December 1987 Soviet-American summit produced an important under-
standing regarding President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).1
While media attention focussed on the dramatic signing of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty,2 the superpowers' informal agreement on SDI
1. SDI envisions the creation of a highly sophisticated defensive system designed to render the
United States invulnerable to ballistic missile attack. President Reagan's dramatic televised
address to the nation on March 23, 1983, is generally credited for giving birth to the program,
although the concept of ballistic missile defense (BMD) had existed for some decades prior to
the Reagan Administration. See Address of President Reagan to the Nation on Defense and
National Security, I PuB. PAPERS 437 (Mar. 23, 1983). Soon after his speech, the media dubbed
the President's plan "Star Wars," borrowing the name of a popular science fiction film. In
January 1984, in response to the recommendation of the Fletcher Committee, the President
formally established SDI as a federal research and technology program. The Department of
Defense chartered the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) in April 1984 to
coordinate achievement of SDI's goals. See STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIE ORGANIZATION,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 1-1 (1987) [hereinafter SDIO
REPORT]. Later in 1984, the President asked for an annual funding rate of $4 billion, to be
increased in later years, for the SDIO and related programs. Carnesale, The Strategic Defense
Initiative, in AMERiCAN DEFENSE AlNUAL: 1985-1986 at 191 (1985). Congress has shown
reluctance to grant the President's full SDI budget requests. For instance, Reagan's request
for a fiscal year 1988 appropriation of $5.8 billion for SDI was slashed in both House and
Senate versions of the annual defense authorization bill. See National Defense Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, §221, 101 Stat. 1055 (1988) [hereinafter
Nat'l Def. Auth. Act]. The Senate approved $4.5 billion for SDI in 1987 and the House $3.12
billion; the compromise reflects an understanding arrived at between the Administration and
Congress on whether SDI complies with certain U.S. treaty obligations. See infra note 44-46
and accompanying text. Towell, $13 Billion Pared From '88 Pentagon Spending, 46 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 55, 56 (Jan. 9, 1988) and Legislative Summary: Defense 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 3217 (Dec. 26, 1987). See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. Policymakers led by
U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, have proposed
substantially reorienting and limiting SDI to create a program that would principally serve to
protect the nation against accidental Soviet launches. Towell, Nunn Suggests Redirecting the
SDI Program, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 154 (Jan. 23, 1988).
Literally hundreds of books, articles and governmental reports trace the growth of SDI and
discuss its impact on technology, arms control and foreign policy. A representative sampling
follows. See generally R.W. TUCKER, G. LisKA, R.E. OSGOOD & D.P. CALLEO, SDI AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLiCY (1987); THE STAR WARS DEBATE (S. Anzovin ed. 1986); PROMSE OR PERIL:
Tm STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIE (Z. Brzezinski ed. 1986); THM STAR WARS CONTROVERSY
(S.E. Miller & S. VanEvera eds. 1986); THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON DETERRENCE (D.G. Dallmyer ed. 1986); L. PRESSLER, STAR WARS (1985); A. CHALFONT,
STAR WARS (1985) and S.D. DRELL, P.J. FARLEY & D. HOLLOWAY, THE REAGAN STRATEGIC
DEFENSE INITIATIVE: A TECHNICAL, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL ASSESSMENT (1984).
2. In essence, the INF Treaty bans intermediate-range nuclear forces. According to data exchanged
by the two governments at the December 7, 1987, signing ceremonies, the Treaty would
eliminate a total of 859 U.S. and 1,836 Soviet missiles from the nations' arsenals. The Treaty
also provides for the removal of some 2000 warheads, mainly Soviet. However, this number
remains inexact because the missiles to be eliminated include many that carry no warheads or
that the nations have not yet deployed. Further Treaty provisions mandate the removal from
Europe of U.S. warheads slated for use on West German INF missiles, the mutual exchange
of resident inspection teams at missile assembly plants in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., detailed
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may prove to be as influential as the INF accord. By "agreeing to disagree" 3 on
whether SDI comports with U.S. treaty obligations, Reagan and General Secretary
Mikhail S. Gorbachev declined to confront a difficult issue.4 Nonetheless, future
accords still very much depend upon whether the superpowers can ultimately
reach an understanding on SDI.5
Domestically, the debate over SDI is not confined to the technological or
arms control arenas, but implicates international and constitutional law as well. 6
SDI is subject to legal obstructions posed by several international agreements to
which the United States is a party. These agreements, most notably the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union 7, potentially limit
certain aspects of the research, deployment and composition of continental defense
systems. s According to one interpretation of the ABM Treaty9, SDI has already
procedures for INF missile inspection, removal and destruction and detailed procedures for
Treaty compliance verification. See Rules, Timetables: What the Pact Would Do, 46 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 150 (Jan. 23, 1988) and N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at Al, col. 1 and A24,
col. I.
The Senate ratified the INF Treaty on May 27, 1988, by a vote of 93-5. 134 CONG. REC.
S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988). See also Hook, Morehouse & Towell, Senate Votes 93-5 to
Approve Ratification of the INF Treaty, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1431 (May 28, 1988). The
INF Treaty became effective when President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev ex-
changed documents of ratification. See 134 CONG. REc. S7137 (daily ed. May 27, 1988)
(discussing ratification procedure) and Felton, Moscow Summit: Upbeat Tone, Limited Results,
46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1513 (June 4, 1988).
3. After President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF accord, the Admin-
istration released a joint U.S.-Soviet communique regarding SDI. The communique, which one
congressional commentator called "studiedly ambiguous," did not resolve the debate over
whether or not proposed testing of SDI components violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States. See infra note 7 and accompanying
text. The Administration claimed the communique permitted SDI-related tests in outer space,
in accordance with Reagan's "nonrestrictive" interpretation of the Treaty. See infra notes 40-
44 and accompanying text. Gorbachev gave no such interpretation of the communique. Towell,
Old Adversaries Turn to Pragmatic Diplomacy, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3023 (Dec. 12,
1987) and N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1987, Al, col. 3.
4. Indeed, Reagan and Gorbachev's 1986 summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, foundered almost at the
outset on the issue of SDI. Towell, supra note 3, at 3023 and N.Y. Times, supra note 3, at
Al, col. 3.
5. See Towell, On SDI and Long-Range Missiles: A Combination of Punting and Progress, 45
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3026 (Dec. 12, 1987) and N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at A34, col. 1
(editorial).
6. See generally Parkerson, International Legal Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative,
116 Mm. L. REv. 67 (1987); The Legal Issues In the ABM Treaty Fuel Debate Over the SDI
Program, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REp. 272 (Feb. 14, 1987); Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation and
the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and Development, 80 AM.
J. INT'L LAW 854 (1985); Note, International Law Implications of the Strategic Defense
Initiative, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 893 (1985); Prognosis for an Ex-virgin (The 1972 ABM Treaty),
ECONOMIST 292 (Nov. 2, 1985) and Note, The Legality of a High-Technology Missile Defense
System, 78 J. INT'L LAW 418 (1984).
7. Officially known as the Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503
[herinafter ABM Treaty], President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
signed the ABM Treaty in Moscow on May 26, 1972. The U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty on
August 3, 1972, and it took effect on October 3, 1972.
8. According to the Department of Defense, SDI involves a space-based defense system with five
integrated functions: surveilling Soviet ICBM launch sites, tracking missiles through their
trajectories, identifying missiles and distinguishing them from decoys, intercepting and destroy-
ing missiles and warheads, and coordinating and controlling the disparate components of the
system. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MIssILEs: AN ASSESSMENT OF TECH-
NOLOGIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 15-16 (1984).
9. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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placed the United States in anticipatory violation of treaty provisions.10 Analysts
have proposed several solutions to alleviate this tension between the treaties and
SDI."
This note surveys international agreements that SDI may violate and discusses
the policies underlying these potential legal and diplomatic conflicts. Part I
provides an overview of the ABM Treaty, with emphasis on the provisions
involved in the present interpretation controversy. Part II considers five other
international covenants containing provisions upon which SDI may ultimately
encroach. Part III evaluates several policy proposals that would permit SDI to
proceed consistently with American international diplomatic commitments. This
part also examines how an outright abrogation of the ABM Treaty or other
agreements might affect American credibility and the arms control process.
PART 1: THE ABM TREATY AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS
The 1972 ABM Treaty remains the longest-lived product of the first round
of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT 1).12 In drafting the document,
American treaty negotiatiors labored against a backdrop of heated debate at
home between those who supported nascent American efforts in the area of
ballistic missile defense (BMD) 3 and those who opposed BMD. 4 Ultimately, the
ABM Treaty substantially reflected the viewpoint of BMD opponents. 5
A. Reading the Treaty
In conformity with the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD),16
article I specifically prohibits either nation from deploying systems designed to
10. Id.
11. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 49. The United States and the Soviet Union conducted SALT I from December
1969 to May 1972. It was the first and, until the Senate recently ratified the INF Treaty, the
only set of U.S.-Soviet negotiations to produce an accord on nuclear arms. See generally Gray,
The Missile Defense Debate In the Early 1970s, reprinted in PRONSE OR PERIL: THE STRATEGIC
DEFENSE INITIATIVE, supra note 1.
13. During the 1960's the United States tentatively developed the "Sentinel" system of antimissile
missiles designed to protect U.S. population centers from nuclear attack. In early 1969 President
Nixon announced a revision of the program, renamed "Safeguard," to defend hardened
Minuteman ICBM silos. Gray, supra note 12, at 33.
14. In the late 1960's, domestic opponents of missile defense systems put forward three major
arguments against BMD, arguments that have resurfaced in current debates over SDI. Opponents
argued that, first, Congress should reject BMD because of technological unfeasibility and,
second, prohibitive cost. Third, any form of strategic defense would dangerously destabilize
the precarious balance between the two superpowers, which purportedly rested upon the nations'
shared fear that offensive action by one would invite massive retaliation by the other. This
doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) had guided arms control theory throughout
the 1960's, and strongly influenced both nations' decisions to adopt the ABM Treaty. Id. at
33-37. As Gerard Smith, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of the principal
architects of SALT I, pointed out, "[e]ven in the event that one of the sides was the first to
be subjected to attack, it would undoubtedly retain the ability to inflict a retaliatory blow of
destructive force. It would be tantamount to suicide for the ones who decided to start the
war." G. SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF SALT I at 83 (1980). Marshal N. V. Ogarkov,
Chief of the Soviet General Staff, echoed Smith's remarks when he commented in the official
Red Army newspaper that "in contemporary conditions only suicides can wager on a first
nuclear strike." Krasnaya Zvezda, Sept. 23, 1983, at 1.
15. See supra note 14.
16. Id.
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provide blanket protection of that nation's entire territory.17 Article III permits
each country to build and maintain missile defense systems to protect two specific
areas: the national capital and a single continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch
site.18 The Treaty limits each of these systems to 100 ABM launchers and a
specified number of accompanying radar complexes.' 9 None of these restrictions,
however, apply to ABM components used solely for testing and development at
currently agreed-upon test sites.
20
Article V of the Treaty amplifies the above restrictions by prohibiting the
deployment, or even the testing and development, of ABM systems or components
based in space, in the air, under the sea or in a mobile format on land. 2' Also,
to prevent circumvention of these terms, the parties agreed in article VI not to
give ABM capability to any weapons systems primarily designed for other
purposes, such as conventional air defense. 22
The Treaty allows each nation to utilize any technical means at its disposal,
within the bounds of international law, to verify compliance with the Treaty
provisions.2 3 Furthermore, the Treaty prevents either nation from trying to subvert
the Treaty's goals through deliberate concealment of violative behavior. 24 For
these and other purposes, article XIII establishes a joint Standing Consultative
Committee (SCC) comprised of American and Soviet representatives, charged
with the duty of continually examining the Treaty in light of changing external
circumstances. 25 Article XIV of the Treaty specifically authorizes amendments
designed to enhance the Treaty's viability. 26 Article XIV also calls for bipartisan
review of the entire Treaty every five years. 27 Finally, article XV, while giving
the Treaty unlimited duration, 2 allows for either party "in exercising its national
sovereignty" to withdraw from the Treaty six months after giving notice of its
intention to withdraw.
29
17. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. I, para. 2.
18. Id. at art. III.
19. Id.
20. Id. Agreed-upon test sites for the U.S. are the White Sands and Kwajalein Missile Ranges.
21. Id. However, as pointed out by Richard Godwin, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
in testimony before a Senate subcommittee, "nowhere does the ABM Treaty [prohibit] 're-
search.' Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet delegations to the SALT II negotiations believed that
it was possible to verify limitations on research." Compliance of the SDI Program With the
ABM Treaty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Force and Nuclear Deterrence of
the Senate Armed Services Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1987) [hereinafter Compliance
Hearings]. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition is one of the principal
U.S. governmental units responsible for overseeing compliance of new weapons with interna-
tional agreements.
22. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. VI.
23. Id. at art. XII, para. 1.
24. Id.
25. Id. at art. XIII, para. 1, lists potential areas which the SCC should monitor. These include
changes in relevant defense technologies, compliance levels of the parties, attempts by either
nation to subvert or evade the Treaty and possible amendments. Id.
26. Id. at art. XIV, para. 1.
27. Id. at art. XIV, para. 2.
28. Id. at art. XV, para. 1.
29. Each superpower, under art. XV, para. 2, retains "the right to withdraw from [the] Treaty if
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty have jeopardized
its supreme interests." Id., art. XV, para. 2. The Treaty requires a withdrawing party to
furnish the other with six months' prior notice and a statement of reasons for its withdrawal.
Id. The recently ratified INF Treaty contains a nearly identical escape proposal in its art. XV.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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B. Interpreting the Treaty
Since SDI contemplates a BMD of continental scope, its actual deployment
as envisioned would breach article I of the ABM Treaty.30 Furthermore, the
Treaty even limits testing and development of a BMD to stationary, land-based
BMD systems.3" Article V does not clearly state just what proportion of such a
land-based system the U.S. could place in space. 32 According to the Pentagon
and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, this uncertainty has forced the
United States to infer certain compliance standards from the black letter of the
Treaty.
33
Another source of debate over ABM Treaty interpretation arises out of the
document's treatment of new technologies. 34 Particle beams, chemical lasers,
hypervelocity rail guns and other so-called "exotic" weapons systems have enjoyed
consideration as components of proposed BMD systems.33 Naturally, the ABM
Treaty does not mention many of these new technologies; many did not yet apply
to BMD at the time of the Treaty or did not yet exist.3 6 This failure presents
30. "In general as a lawyer I would call the whole strategic defense program an anticipatory
breach of contract." G. Smith, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Reagan Administration's "New
Interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, reprinted in TIlE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: NEW
PERSPECTrVEs ON DETERRENCE at 55, supra note 1. See also M. Smith, The Legal Implications
of Missile Defense, reprinted in PROMISE OR PERIL: THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATrVE 381,
supra note 1, and Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under
the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper" 99 HARv. L. REv. 1956, 1957 (1986).
31. "No ABM component other than a fixed land-based component may be 'tested in an ABM
mode.' The term 'tested in an ABM mode' is specifically addressed in a classified agreed
statement negotiated in 1978 between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in the Standing Consultative
Commission." Compliance Hearings, supra note 21. See also Chayes & Chayes, supra note
30, at 1957.
32. This is due in part to the absence in the Treaty or its Agreed Statements of any strict definition
of "components" as opposed to "system." SDIO REPORT, supra note 1, at D-2.
33. In doing this, the Department of Defense has proceeded under three "working principles."
These hold: (1) that compliance should be based on objective assessments of each nation's
capabilities so that no double standard develops; (2) that the Treaty does not limit research
and testing short of field testing of a prototype ABM component or system and (3) that the
Treaty restricts only defenses against strategic ballistic missiles and not those against other
forms of nuclear weaponry (such as cruise missiles, nonstrategic missiles, etc.). Id. at D-2
through D-3.
34. M. Smith, supra note 30, at 384.
35. According to SDIO, the U.S. has begun or contemplates seventeen major experiments involving
such exotic systems. Principal among these: the ALPHA program, which is developing a
ground-based device designed to demonstrate the feasibility for defensive purposes of space-
based infrared hydrogen-fluoride lasers; the SKYLITE program, a ground-based non-ABM
capable laser and laser-guidance system undergoing testing at White Sands; the ground-based
Free Electron Laser program, also located at White Sands; the Hypervelocity Rail Gun research
program, which will evaluate whether or not precision-guided kinetic munitions can be suc-
cessfully launched from ground-based guns and other programs which are examining the
feasibility of space-based kinetic kill vehicles. Because of budgetary limitations in fiscal 1988,
the Neutral Particle Beam Technology Integration Experiment has been significantly reduced
in scope. SDIO REPORT, supra note 1, at D-8 through D-14. For a critical assessment of these
and other SDI research programs, see Clausen & Brower, The Confused Course of SDI, TECH.
REV. 60 (Oct. 1987).
36. In recognizing the potential for technological development after 1972, Agreed Statement D
amplifies art. XIII:
In order to ensure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and
their components, . . .the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on
other physical principles [than those outlined in the Treaty] . . .are created in
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particular difficulties in interpreting article II, which defines "ABM system" as
one designed "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory.37 The principal question posed by recent Treaty interpreters asks
whether or not new BMD systems that do not technically consist of "launchers",
"radar" and so forth, infringe upon article I's broad proscriptions."
Most analysts during the decade or so following the Treaty's adoption
apparently assumed that article I prohibited continental ABM defenses, regardless
of their makeup.3 9 A number of policy makers still adhere to this view, and
bitterly criticize the current form of the SDI proposal. 40 The Reagan Administra-
tion labeled the viewpoint of these policymakers the "restrictive" interpretation
of the ABM Treaty.
4'
The Reagan Administration, has argued since 1985 that it has not violated
the Treaty by developing and testing "exotic" weapons systems that the Treaty
does not specifically prohibit, i.e., space-based weapons systems.4 2 The Admin-
istration maintained that Agreed Statement D provides for discussion between
the parties to determine the status of not-yet-envisioned weapons systems. 4a Thus,
SDI could move forward under Agreed Statement D even if the "restrictive"
interpretation holds."
the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be
subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance
with Article XIV of the Treaty.
23 U.S.T. 3456, T.I.A.S. 7503.
37. The ABM Treaty defines an "ABM system" as "currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor
missiles . . . (b) ABM launchers . . . and (c) ABM radars." 23 U.S.T. at 3439.
38. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 30, at 1957.
39. G. Smith, supra note 29, at 57.
40. See, e.g., Center for Defense Information, Star Wars Reality: The Emperor Has No Clothes,
17 THE DEFENSE MONITOR 1 (Jan. 1988); Pike, Goals of the ABM Treaty, 40 F.A.S. PUB.
INTEREST REP. 1 (Sep. 1987); R. McNAmARA, BLUNDERING INTO DISASTER 92 (1986); G. Smith,
supra notes 15 and 30; Chayes & Chayes, supra note 30 and Clausen & Brower, supra note
35. See also supra note 6.
41. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE ABM TREATY STUDIES, PART I:
TREATY LANGUAGE AND NEGOTIATING HISTORY 7-10 (1987) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T STUDY]
and Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program, reprinted in TBE STRATEGIC DEFENSE
INITIATIVE: NEw PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 59, 61, supra note 1.
42. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1972, 1974
(1986). The Reagan Administration's dissatisfaction with the ABM Treaty predates SDI.
American negotiators began the autumn 1982 round of U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) with a plenary statement criticizing the ABM Treaty and linking U.S. compliance
with START success. S. TALBOTT, DEADLY GAMBITS 317-21 (1984).
43. The Reagan administration read article II as referring "only to ABM systems and components
based on physical principles underlying conventional systems then in existence [1972]." The
Administration therefore concluded that the Treaty permits the creation of substitute ABM
systems and components based on new principles, but prohibits their deployment without
further agreement with the Soviets as to specific limitations. STATE DEP'T STUDY, supra note
41, at 10-11. Sofaer, supra note 37, at 63.
44. The State Department has considered yet a third interpretation of the Treaty, which, in the
words of its legal experts, is "an even broader view." It holds that the Soviet Union and the
United States are permitted to deploy exotic weapons systems based on newly developed
principles, even if the parties disagree on specific limitations. This interpretation also derives
from Agreed Statement D, and focuses on its failure to unequivocally prohibit the deployment
of exotic devices. Even so, the State Department feels that the rest of the Treaty's language
casts "grave doubt" on the validity of this interpretation. STATE DEP'T STUDY, supra note 41,
at 11.
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Congress has resolved the debate in favor of the traditional restrictive
interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Autumn 1987 deliberations over defense
appropriations saw both the Senate and House amend the annual authorizations
bill to ban testing of BMD systems in space.45 Furthermore, under a compromise
reached with Reagan Administration aides, the House resolved that in 1988 no
SDI testing would take place that would conflict with the restrictive interpreta-
tion.46
PART II: OTHER TREATIES RESTRAINING SDI
In addition to the ABM Treaty, the United States has entered into several
other arms agreements that pose potential obstacles to SDI .47 These agreements
include the Limited Test Ban Treaty,4s SALT I,49 SALT 11,50 the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, 1 and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
2
A. Limited Test Ban Treaty
On August 5, 1963, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union signed the first treaty that limited the use of weapons in outer space,
53
45. Both houses of Congress voted to amend their respective defense appropriations bills by
considerable margins. The Senate, particularly, dealt the Reagan Administration a blow by
rejecting, 58 votes to 38, Republican attempts to remove the Levin-Nunn restrictive interpre-
tation rider from the Senate defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1988. Towell, Senate
Deals Reagan a Major Defeat on SDI, 45 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2228 (Sep. 29, 1987).
46. The compromise, Nat'l Def. Auth. Act, supra note 1, permitted the Pentagon to plan for
more extensive SDI testing in fiscal year 1989 and beyond, but refused to allow procurement
in 1988 of hardware to conduct such future tests. In return for these concessions, Congress
gave the Administration slightly greater SDI funding, i.e., $3.62 billion, than what an exact
average between House ($3.12 billion) and Senate ($4.5 billion) figures would have produced.
Legislative Summary: Defense, supra note 1, at 3217.
47. For other discussions of treaties that relate to the Strategic Defense Initiative, see Gallagher,
Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 111 Mn. L. REV. 11 (1986); Parkerson, supra
note 6; Article, "Star Wars": An International Legal Analysis, 3 CAN.-AM. L.J. 169 (1986);
Goldman, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Star Wars and Star Laws, 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. Ill
(1986); Note, The Legality of President Reagan's Proposed Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense
System, 14 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp'. L. 329 (1984); Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful
Remedies for Violations of Arms Control Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at
the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POt. 73 (1985); Sherr, Legal Issues of the "Star Wars"
Defense Program, 16 U. TOL. L .REv. 125 (1984); Wulf, Arms Control-Outer Space, 11 J.
SPACE L. 67 (1983) and Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13
AKRON L. REV. 649 (1980).
48. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 430
[hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty]. This treaty has several common names: the Limited
Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and
the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.
49. Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3463, T.I.A.S. 7504 [hereinafter SALT I].
50. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms with Protocol, June 18, 1979 [hereinafter SALT
II] (not ratified by the United States).
51. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty].
52. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3, 1974 [hereinafter Threshold
Test Ban Treaty] (not ratified by the United States).
53. Danielson, Examination of Proposals Relating to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space, 12 J. SPACE L. 1, 2 (1984) and U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DisARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMs
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTs 34-40 (1982).
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the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, commonly referred to as the Limited Test Ban Treaty . 4 Article
III provides that any state may adopt the treaty" and most countries have indeed
done So.
5 6
The crux of the Limited Test Ban Treaty is article I, which prohibits "any
nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere,
outer space or underwater.17 The Treaty does not ban underground nuclear
explosions that do not cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the
territorial limits" of the conducting state." According to article IV, any party
may withdraw from the Treaty upon three months notice if extraordinary events
have jeopardized the supreme interests of that party.5 9
In view of these provisions, the Limited Test Ban Treaty constrains SDI
systems involving nuclear explosions. An example of such a system is the proposed
Excalibur X-ray laser BMD system that relies upon nuclear explosions in outer
space for laser energization. 60 The Treaty does not prohibit research, testing, and
deployment of a SDI system if the research , testing, and deployment does not
involve an actual nuclear detonation in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater.
However, the Treaty would permit an underground nuclear detonation in devel-
oping SDI.
B. Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties
The Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) was concluded on May 26, 1972, simul-
taneously with the ABM Treaty.6 ' The Senate approved the agreement and it
became effective on October 3, 1972. 62 It was to remain in effect for five years,
unless a subsequent, more complete agreement replaced it sooner.6 3 SALT I
complemented the ABM Treaty by limiting competition in offensive strategic
missiles until further negotiations could reach more conclusive results. 4 As the
end of the five-year effective period approached, the United States and the Soviet
Union realized that they could not complete a successive agreement before SALT
I expired. On September 23, 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance issued a
Unilateral Policy Declaration stating that the United States would not take any
action inconsistent with SALT 165 and thus indefinitely extended the coverage of
SALT I without Senate approval.
Negotiations continued, as required by article VII of SALT I,6 and on June
18, 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into the Treaty Between
54. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 48.
55. Id., art. III.
56. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, supra note 53, at 40.
57. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 48, art. I, § 1.
58. Id.
59. Id., art. IV.
60. Note, "Star Wars": An International Legal Analysis, supra note 47, at 179.
61. SALT I, supra note 49.
62. Pub. L. No. 92-448, 86 Stat. 746 (1972).
63. SALT I, supra note 49, art. VII, § 2.
64. Id. Preamble.
65. 77 DEP'T ST. BULL. 642 (1977).
66. SALT I, supra note 49, art. VII.
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the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II).67 The SALT II Treaty provided
for an effective period extending through December 31, 1985,68 but the Senate
never ratified the Treaty and it expired. Nevertheless, President Reagan initially
declared that the United States would abide by SALT II as long as the Soviet
Union continued to do likewise. 69 Recently, however, President Reagan announced
that the United States would no longer abide by SALT 11.70
Currently, neither SALT I nor SALT II legally binds the United States.
SALT "understandings" declared by the president or other government officials
have no legal effect, since the Arms Control and Disarmament Act prohibits any
agreement the terms of which obligate the United States to limit its armaments
without express congressional authority. 7' Nevertheless, because some authorities
suggest that the SALT documents have some legal consequence, this note discusses
the impact of these agreements on SDI.
72
SALT I and II restricted the development and number of offensive strategic
arms. SDI potentially threatens compliance with the numerical limits set by the
SALT agreements by pressuring the Soviet Union to build up offensive strategic
missiles to overcome the ABM defenses. The consequence could be an arms race
in precisely those areas most critical to future negotiations between the United
States and Soviet Union, namely large multiple independent reentry vehicles and
cruise missiles .73
Although the SALT agreements generally apply to strategic offensive weap-
ons, article IX of SALT II may apply to some systems contemplated by SDI.
Article IX forbids placing nuclear weapons into earth orbit.7 4 Depending on how
literally the SALT II drafters intended "earth orbit" to be used, article IX could
67. SALT II, supra note 50.
68. Id. art. XIX.
69. On May 3, 1982, President Reagan stated, "as for existing arms agreements, we will refrain
from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint." 18
WEEKLY Corn'. PRss. Doc. 730 (1982). More recently, on June 10, 1985, President Reagan
reaffirmed this position by stating, "I have decided that the United States will continue to
refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union
exercises comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursues arms
reduction agreements in the currently on-going nuclear and space talks in Geneva." 21 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs Doc. 771 (1985).
70. On May 27, 1986, President Reagan announced that the United States considered the SALT
II limitations a nullity. He stated that the United States would pressure the Soviet Union for
a replacement treaty to reduce superpower arsenals. The Administration's change in policy
resulted, in part, from announcements that planned arming of a 131st B-52 bomber with air-
launched cruise missiles later that year would exceed SALT II limits. President Reagan
emphasized that he would take Soviet action on arms control into account before exceeding
SALT II limits. Wash. Post, June 13, 1986, at Al, col. 2. On November 28, 1986, the United
States did in fact deploy a B-52 bomber capable of carrying cruise missiles. This gave the U.S.
a total of 131 cruise missile-carrying B-52 bombers and thereby exceeded the SALT II limits.
Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1986, at Al, col. 1 and A2, col. 5.
71. 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1982).
72. E.g., Bridge, supra note 47, at 654.
73. Clausen, SDI in Search of a Mission, 2 WORLD POL'Y J. 267 (1985).
74. "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy . . . systems for placing into Earth
orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional
orbital missiles .... " SALT II, supra note 50, art. IX, §l(c).
19891
238 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 15:229
prohibit the nuclear powered X-ray laser that would briefly pass through outer
space, but would not enter a full earth orbit.
7
C. Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for sig-
nature on July 1, 196876 and has become the most widely accepted arms control
treaty, with more than 125 signatory nations. 77 The Treaty revolves around article
I, which prohibits nuclear weapon states from transferring nuclear technology to
non-nuclear nations.78 Similarly, article II prohibits non-nuclear weapon states
from receiving or manufacturing nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
79
The Treaty does not prohibit non-nuclear weapon states from independently
designing their own nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Although the nuclear powered X-ray laser proposed as a component of SDI
is not a nuclear weapon, it requires a nuclear explosive device to generate the X-
ray. s0 Consequently, any plea from the United States for allied participation in
research on the nuclear powered X-ray laser must exclude non-nuclear weapon
allied states such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Japan.8' The
United States may, however, induce and assist nuclear weapon states such as
Great Britain and France to participate in such SDI research. 2 The Treaty would
not allow the United States to transfer to any state, nuclear or non-nuclear, a
completed SDI system involving the nuclear powered X-ray laser.
D. Threshold Test Ban Treaty
On July 3, 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
commonly referred to as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. 3 The Treaty prohibits
underground testing of nuclear weapons exceeding 150 kilotons.84 Each party
undertook the responsibility of verifying compliance by using national technical
means85 and agreed not to interfere with the national technical means of the
other party.86 The Senate never ratified the Treaty and thus it does not legally
bind the United States.
The Limited Test Ban, SALT I, SALT II and the ABM Treaties also include
provisions not to interfere with national technical means of treaty verification.8 7
75. J. POURNELLE & D. ING, MUTUAL ASSURED SURVIVAL 101-02 (1984).
76. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 51.
77. Adelman, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 730, reprinted
in SDI: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 3 (1985).
78. Parties to the Treaty shall not "transfer to any recipient ... nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices . . .; and not in any way assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture, or otherwise acquire."
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 51, art. 1.
79. Id., art. II.
80. J. POURNELLE & D. ING, supra note 75, at 58-61.
81. Parkerson, supra note 6, at 145.
82. Id.
83. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 52.
84. Id., art. I., § 1.
85. Id., art. II, § 1.
86. Id., art. II, § 2.
87. Sherr, supra note 47, at 135.
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These provisions restrain SDI, since any space-based weapon that could destroy
a ballistic missile could also destroy a satellite that serves as a national technical
means of verification."'
PART III. LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTING
SDI
The Strategic Defense Initiative is the culmination of the rise of a national
nuclear arms policy fundamentally at odds with the doctrine of MAD.8 9 The
Reagan Administration embraced a new deterrence theory known as the "national
defense" or "mutually assured survival" theory, which finds its roots in percep-
tion theory and the concept of extended deterrence. 90 A synopsis of the evolution
of this theory illuminates the backdrop against which the current policy contro-
versy concerning SDI unfolds.
Proponents of perception theory believe that superiority in numbers of
nuclear armaments translates into political advantage in international affairs.
While MAD theorists assert that no need exists for exact numerical equivalence
of the nuclear arms possessed by either side, 91 perception theorists argue that
since 1972 the novelty of nuclear weapons has dissipated, and these weapons
have come to be regarded as just another component of each nation's warfighting
arsenal. 92 Thus, the side with the greater number of nuclear weapons will
ultimately exert the greater influence in world affairs. This theory resulted in the
Jackson Amendment to SALT 1. 93 Because the SDI program offers a means of
88. Id.
89. Arms control and political linkage had failed under the MAD regime. It followed
then, that arms control should be less an exercise in political change and more a
functional exercise in meeting national security interests, primarily extended
deterrence. Also, national security was to be sought less in international co-
operation and more in unilateral action.
Smith, The Separation of Arms Control Talks, The Redefinition of Arms Control and Strategy, 15
J. INT'L STUDIES 143 (Summ. 1986).
90. Id.
91. The amendment proposed by Senator Fulbright during the course of the SALT I Interim
Agreement ratification debate is typical of this pragmatic approach. This approach encouraged
the President to continue "negotiations to achieve further limitations on offensive nuclear
weapons systems with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of overall equality,
parity and sufficiency, taking into account all relevant qualitative and quantitative factors
pertaining to the strategic nuclear weapons systems of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the United States of America." 118 CONG. REc. 30623 (1972). Senator Jackson responded
that the "Fulbright amendment would undermine the current negotiating position of the U.S.
Government by justifying on a permanent basis the numerical disparities in the Soviet Union's
favor that the President has accepted only on an interim basis." Id. at 30624.
92. [Thus] the United States cannot simply focus on the relationship between the
number of survivable American warheads and the number of meaningful Soviet
targets. The United States should also be concerned with comparisons of the
gross number of weapons on each side. Apparently, perception theory seeks to
respond to the false belief that American weapons effectively cancel out Soviet
weapons the same way a sword or more troops can offset their counterparts.
Kull, Nuclear Nonsense, 58 FOREIGN PoL'Y 28, 29 (1985).
93. The Jackson Amendment was embodied in the joint resolution approving the SALT I Interim
Agreement, H.R.J. Res. 1227, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), at the insistence of the late
Washington Democrat Henry Jackson. Emphasizing the importance of equality, the amendment
required "the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United
States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits for the Soviet Union."
See also 118 CoNG. REc. 30623 (1972).
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gaining the technological edge in the nuclear balance and the position of apparent
dominance that such an advantage presents, perception theory accounts for some
of the support for SDI.
The second concept of strategic arms control challenging MAD is "extended
deterrence," 94 though exactly which side of the policy debate it supports is
unclear. 9 The extended deterrence paradigm contemplates that with the demise
of the American intermediate range nuclear force in Europe, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) must implement a new deterrent to Soviet adven-
turism. 96 A shift from the use of intermediate range tactical weapons on the
European battlefield to the use of American strategic nuclear weapons directed
against Soviet targets should supply the needed deterrent. Proponents believe that
the United States needs SDI to reduce the threat of Soviet retaliation against the
U.S. mainland by reducing the civilian casualties and improving the survivability
of strategic forces to make this threat effective. 97 Like perception theory, extended
deterrence seeks an advantage in American defensive capability (and concomi-
tantly, offensive capability) as the price exacted for the removal of intermediate
range nuclear weapons from Western Europe.
The new theory, championed by the Reagan Administration, combines the
tenets of perception theory and extended deterrence, resulting in the concept of
national defense.98 This theory seeks to restructure the nuclear arms equation
from the presently existing one, in which each nation's security depends on the
goodwill and self-interest of the other not to start a nuclear conflagration, to a
position in which each nation internally directs its own security. 99 Among the
benefits attributed to the national defense theory is that it is inherently less
volatile. 100 Furthermore, the national defense strategy works with any number of
players.101 This rationale found favor in the Reagan Administration, inspiring
94. The recent agreements between U.S. and Soviet arms control negotiators in Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) has moved this particular theory into the limelight. See, White, European
Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 15 J. OF INT'L STUDIEs 211 (Summ. 1985).
95. At issue, in part, is the perennial West European suspicion that the United States
seeks to separate itself from Western Europe. Some believe that the United States
plans to abandon its security commitments to NATO allies .... [I]n the near
term many in Western Europe would probably see modification of the ABM
Treaty as further proof of U.S. . . . disengagement.
Nacht, ABM ABC's, 46 FOREIGN POL'Y 155 (1982).
96. "MAD was credible for central deterrence, but of little value for extended deterrence. The
United States [holds] other vital interests besides the defense of its homeland .... Smith,
supra note 89, at 150.
97. White, supra note 94 and accompanying text.
98. Nitze & Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and SDI, 24 ATLANTIC COMMUNiTY Q. 255 (Fall 1986) and
see supra note 89.
99. A predominantly defense oriented nuclear balance would let each nation decide its own destiny
under a more stable and secure system. See generally OFF. OF TECH. AssESSMENT, STRATEGIC
DEFENSES 76 (1986).
100. For example, an accidentally launched strategic missile need not result in full scale confrontation
as required by the present system's "use them or lose them" mentality. See generally Weinberg
& Barkenbus, infra note 101.
101. In an arena in which three nuclear-capable superpowers existed, perception theory (and MAD)
would indicate an uncontrollable, upwardly spiralling arms race, as each nation would seek to
expand its nuclear arsenal to have as many weapons as the two other powers combined.
National defense theory, on the other hand, would indicate that each nation need only have
sufficient means to minimize the other powers' use of offensive weapons. In a defense-oriented
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both the SDI program and the promise of reduction in offensive strategic weapons
during SDI deployment.
10 2
Although the SDI rationale is seductive in its simplicity and alluring in its
promise of future offensive weapons reductions, the transition from an offense-
oriented to a defense-oriented nuclear balance involves a number of hazards.
Primary among these is the apparent conflict between the SDI goals and the
presently existing ABM Treaty. 103
Two interpretations of the 1972 ABM Treaty presently exist, as noted above.
The "restrictive" interpretation 14 limits SDI to laboratory research and devel-
opment, short of prototype testing. Deployment of any defensive system other
than fixed, land-based ABM systems pursuant to article V of the Treaty would
require further discussion and agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The "broad" interpretation 10 5 advanced by the Reagan Administration in
1985 contends that the Treaty permits research and development of exotic ABM
systems through field testing, but does not allow actual deployment.
As discussed below, three options exist for reconciling the goals of the SDI
program with the language of the ABM Treaty. First, the United States could
follow the Reagan Administration's broad interpretation of the Treaty. °6 Second,
it could acknowledge reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty as a fruitless exercise
and open negotiations with the Soviet Union to seek amendment of the ABM
Treaty.i07 The last and probably the most destabilizing option, would entail
unilateral withdrawal or abrogation of the Treaty by the United States. The
choice between the three options: following the broad interpretation of the Treaty,
cooperating in amending it or confronting the Soviet Union by abrogating the
world, the powers could strike a balance of offensive strategic nuclear weapons at a much
lower level. The impetus for a large number of offensive weapons to assure that some would
survive a first attack (a fundamental premise of MAD) would no longer operate. See, Weinberg
& Barkenbus, Stabilizing Star Wars, 54 FOREIGN POL'Y 164 (1984).
102. See generally Address of President Reagan to the Nation on Defense and National Security,
supra note 1. President Reagan envisioned a substantial reduction in the number of offensive
nuclear weapons as a key goal, that the United States can attain by the implementation of
SDI. The BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE report published by the Office of Technology Assessment
in STRATEoIC DEFENSES, supra note 99, reflects this policy:
In the absence of coordinated structuring of defenses and offenses on the two
sides, the United States would have to anticipate and adapt in advance to a wide
range of potential Soviet responses. Even if the cost-exchange ratio between
defense and offense favored the defense, the transition period could bring a costly
arms competition until the effects of the cost-exchange ratio asserted themselves.
Id.
103. See supra note 7.
104. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 30, at 1956.
105. Sofaer, supra note 42, at 1973.
106. Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM Treaty Conflict, 28
HARv. INT'L LAW J. 31 (Winter 1987).
107. While Professor Nacht's article predates President Reagan's announcement of the Strategic
Defense Initiative, it provides an interesting discussion of the alternatives available for dealing
with the ABM Treaty in the context of BMD development. "[O]pening up the ABM Treaty
to renegotiation and not achieving a new agreement could lead to abrogation of the present
treaty and to the collapse of any hope for the continuation of U.S.-Soviet arms control
agreement." Nacht, supra note 95, at 168. Professor Nacht concludes, however, that "[tihe
United States could reconsider renegotiation at . . . the SCC review session . . . if sufficient
progress in BMD system development has been made." Id. at 174.
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Treaty, will have a critical impact on the delicate balance which has existed for
several decades.
A. Technical Compliance with the Broad Interpretation of the ABM Treaty
When the Reagan Administration initially launched the SDI program, the
Administration envisioned it as a multilayered defense system incorporating exotic
space-based laser systems in its first tier of defense. 0 s Subsequent research and
mounting pressure to obtain immediate results has driven the near-term program
away from laser and particle beam systems to kinetic energy (i.e., impact) missiles
launched from orbiting space stations. °9 As the near-term program drifts away
from the exotic technology towards more commonplace missile technology, the
clash with the current ABM Treaty prohibitions becomes more strident.
The major policy issue arising from the adoption of the Reagan Adminis-
tration's "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty concerns legitimacy."10 If
the United States pursues a program in technical compliance with a reconstructed
Treaty, which some authorities view as nullifying the fundamental purpose of
the Treaty, the signal sent to the Soviet Union could be easily misunderstood."'
American pursuit of SDI development under the broad interpretation of the
ABM Treaty could undermine U.S. credibility in the international forum and
denigrate the United States leadership role in world affairs. The United States
may have already felt the foreign relations ramifications of adopting this policy
in pursuing SDI-the Soviet Union has charged the United States with intention-
ally violating the ABM Treaty.
1 2
The domestic understanding of the Reagan Administration's position leads
inexorably to the legal issues underlying the interpretation of the ABM Treaty
and especially the interplay of the three coordinate branches of government in
determining the definitive interpretation of a treaty. The executive branch has
the power to make treaties with the "advice and consent" of the Senate." 3 The
executive has a plenary role in negotiating treaties." 4 Clearly, however, article II
108. SDIO REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-4.
109. Clausen & Brower, supra note 35, at 60.
110. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. Nuclear deterrence relies for its effectiveness on the accurate perception by both the U.S. and
the Soviet Union of the other party's acts. Where one party's actions are no longer consonant
with that party's behavior, the potential exists that incongruous messages will alarm the
opponent and jeopardize the existing stability. Such action invites miscalculation by the Soviet
Union, whose response may range from rapid deployment of current technology ABM systems
to further build up of offensive strategic weapons. See supra note 106. See also, Technical
Panel on Missile Defense of the George C. Marshall Institute, SDI: Making America Secure,
15 NAT'L REV. 36 (Apr. 1988).
112. The commentators suggest that the nicety of technical compliance with the reinterpreted treaty
is perhaps geared more towards the U.S. domestic audience than towards the international
community. The Soviet Union, in particular, has already rejected such compliance as repugnant
to the spirit and the letter of the 1972 agreement. Marshall Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet
General Staff, referred to the SDI program as a "direct breach" of the ABM Treaty. See
Gross, supra note 106, at n.88.
113. The executive branch "shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CoNST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
114. The lofty language of United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319, 57 S.
Ct. 216, 220, 81 L. Ed. 255, 262 (1936), clearly states: ". . . the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the senate, but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it."
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of the U.S. Constitution provides the Senate with a voice in the determination
of American commitment to executive agreements and negotiated treaties via the
ratification power reserved to it."' Finally, the role of the judiciary since Marbury
v. Madison has been "to say what the law is.
'
116
The issue presented by the current controversy over the "correct" interpre-
tation of the ABM Treaty is whether the executive branch can infuse a treaty,
presented and ratified by the Senate, with meaning beyond that presented to the
Senate during the ratification process. The judiciary's role1 17 in resolving this
dispute seems fairly clear: the interpretation of the ratified treaty as the law of
the land should prove no more difficult based on the presentations made to the
Senate during the ratification process than other routine judicial contruction of
federal law based on legislative history."' The judiciary, however, has been
particularly reluctant to intrude into the President's foreign affairs powers." '9 The
ABM Treaty interpretation controversy concerns not the abrogation of the Treaty,
but rather the construction of the "true" meaning of the Treaty as ratified.
Despite inherent difficulties in bringing the action' 20 the case appears to be one
in which the powers granted to the three coordinate branches converge. Thus,
the judiciary, if it chose, could play a central role in determining the content of
the Treaty. '
2'
115. Article VI provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See
also, Note, Star Wars meets the ABM Treaty Termination Controversy, 10 N. CAR. J. INT'L
LAW AND COM. REG. 701 (1985).
116. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60, 73 (1803).
117. Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . . and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .. "
118. Powell, J., concurring, notes that where "no lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving" the case exists, the controversy is suitable for adjudication by the
court. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999, 100 S. Ct. 533, 535, 62 L. Ed. 2d 428, 429
(1979)(mem.).
119. In Goldwater v. Carter, id., the Supreme Court declined to adjudicate an action brought by
Senator Goldwater against President Carter for the latter's unilateral decision to abrogate a
mutual defense treaty between Taiwan and the United States. Abrogating the treaty enabled
the United States to recognize the Beijing government. The Court found the issue a nonjusti-
ciable political dispute, noting that "the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the
senate shall participate in the ratification of the treaty, [but] it is silent as to that body's
participation in the abrogation of a treaty." 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
120. Generally, before any action posing a dispute between the executive and legislative branches is
ready for judicial review, each branch of government must have "taken action asserting its
constitutional authority." Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997 and see supra note 118.
121. The Levin-Nunn provision included in the 1988 defense authorization bill barred the Reagan
Administration from abandoning the traditional interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, without
congressional consent. See supra, note 45. Where the restriction on the executive branch applies
in an area over which the President arguably has plenary powers, the constitutional validity
of such a provision could be suspect.
Senate ratification of the INF Treaty was subject to executive branch commitment to comply
with the Byrd Amendment, which limits the Treaty interpretation powers of the President. The
Amendment provides that the U.S. shall interpret the Treaty in accordance with the common
understanding of the Treaty shared by the President and the Senate at the time the Senate
gave its advice and consent to ratification. Such common understanding is based on the text
of the Treaty and the President's representations to the Senate. The Amendment further
provides that the U.S. shall not agree to or adopt an interpretation different from that common
understanding except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol,
or enactment of a statute. See 134 CoNG. REC. S6853 (dally ed. May 26, 1988). This provision
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B. U.S.-Soviet Negotiated Amendment to the 1972 ABM Treaty
A second alternative involves negotiation between the United States and the
Soviet Union to amend the ABM Treaty to permit development and deployment
of SDI systems by both parties. In spite of the article XV, paragraph 1 provision
that "this Treaty shall be of unlimited duration", 22 the article XIV requirement
that the parties meet at five year intervals to "review" the Treaty, 23 coupled
with the creation of the SCC in article XIII, 124 indicates that the parties did not
regard the Treaty as immutable. Rather, article XIV, paragraph 1 specifically
provides that "each party may propose amendments to this Treaty."'
' 25
Although American attempts to open negotiations with the Soviet Union to
amend the Treaty to allow field testing and deployment of SDI could itself
provide a public relations bonanza, linkage of the negotations to sizable reductions
in strategic offensive weapons could result in genuine Soviet interest in trans-
forming nuclear arsenals to a defense-oriented balance. Such proposals may be
met with greater receptivity by both the U.S. domestic audience and world
opinion, and could lend the endeavor an aura of legitimacy which some com-
mentators view the first alternative discussed above as lacking. The concept of
defense protected build-down is advanced by several foreign policy commentators
as the best means of enhancing national security as well as superpower nuclear
stability. 126 Article XIII empowers the SCC to "consider possible changes in the
strategic situation which will have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty."'' 27
The SCC is the logical starting point of any U.S. effort to gain the cooperation
of the Soviet Union in substituting the new national defense deterrence theory
for the current regime of MAD.
The domestic legal situation surrounding good faith attempts by the United
States to open treaty negotiations appears to be less inflammatory than the
interpretation controversy. Since it is wholly within the executive branch's province
to negotiate treaties with foreign powers, the United States could initiate talks
related to the amendment of the ABM Treaty unhampered by congressional
action. 28 The ABM Treaty serves as the cornerstone of U.S.-Soviet arms control
agreements. Should the United States go forward with SDI testing, altering the
Treaty by amendment rather than by technical compliance with a broad inter-
pretation of the Treaty should improve the chances of preserving cordial relations
between the two countries. Even if the parties ultimately cannot reach a consensus
is prophylatic in nature and has no affect on the ABM interpretation controversy. Hook, supra
note 2, at 1434.
122. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
126. See Weinberg & Barkenbus, supra note 101.
127. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
128. U.S. to Submit Anti-Missile Treaty, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1988, at A3, col. 4. The proposed
treaty codifies the current American position that neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union should withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1994. The Soviet draft of the protocol
calls for "compliance and nonwithdrawal" from the ABM Treaty for a 10-year period. The
American proposal reflected the Reagan Administration's refusal to engage in negotiations on
what testing the ABM Treaty permits, and insisted that this issue be kept separate from the
question of continued nonwithdrawal.
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on a Treaty amendment, conducting negotiations in good faith reduces the
potential for misunderstanding between the parties.
C. Treaty Abrogation
The difficulties in amending or reinterpreting the ABM Treaty may make
abrogation of the Treaty a logical step for an administration intent on deploying
a strategic defense system. The ABM Treaty 29 permits either party to withdraw
"if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests."' 30 The withdrawing party alone has the
responsibility for making a good faith determination of whether events have
jeopardized its supreme interests.
The United States entered into the ABM Treaty believing that once the two
nations restricted antiballistic missile development, significant offensive weapons
control would follow. 3' In an appendix to the Treaty, the United States delegation
emphasized: "If an agreement providing for more complete strategic arms limi-
tations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be
jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty. 1 1 32 Thus, the current absence of a comprehensive U.S.-Soviet
strategic weapon limitation agreement may be an extraordinary event which
justifies a U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty under article XV.' 31 Interna-
tional law permits termination of a treaty in conformity with the provisions of
the treaty.
34
Where conditions have changed drastically since the signing of a treaty,
another principle of international law-the change of circumstances doctrine,
rebus sic stantibus-applies3 5 Article LXII of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties explains that a change of circumstances may not be invoked as
a ground for terminating a treaty unless the existence of those circumstances
constituted an essential basis of the party's consent to be bound by the treaty,
and that party's obligations are substantially altered. 3 6 Applying the doctrine to
129. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. XV, para. 1.
130. Id., art. XV, para 2. The article further provides that the withdrawing party give six months
notice prior to withdrawal.
131. According to the MAD rationale, with ABM systems severely limited, neither side would have
any incentive to significantly increase its offensive ballistic missile capabilities. W. VAN CLEAVE,
FORTRESS USSR 13 (1986).
132. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, at Unilateral Statement A.
133. It is unclear whether the recent INF accord with the Soviet Union is an "agreement" under
Unilateral Statement A. The Reagan Administration believed that the SALT accords do not
satisfactorily protect U.S. strategic interests. Since the Senate has not ratified them, the SALT
accords may not constitute an "agreement" under Unilateral Statement A. See Note, The
Legality of a High Technology Missile Defense System, supra note 6, at 421.
134. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 679, 699 (1969).
135. The policy behind the doctrine of changed circumstances involves the fact that treaties may
remain in force for a long time and may place unnecessary burdens on one of the parties due
to a fundamental change of circumstances. If the aggrieved party can withdraw from the treaty
due to the circumstance, this induces the other party to negotiate a solution by legal means.
T.O. ELIAS, TE MODERN LAW OF TRE.rEs 121 (1974).
136. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may
not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty
19891
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 15:229
the ABM Treaty, the unexpected failure to achieve limitations in offensive
weapons may be a fundamental change of circumstances, because the United
States identified timely limits in offensive strategic arms as essential to its supreme
interests. 1' Both parties considered progress in limiting offensive strategic arms
an essential premise of the ABM Treaty. 13
For the doctrine of changed circumstances to apply, the absence and failure
of arms control agreements must also radically transform the United States
obligation not to deploy antiballistic missiles. The current Soviet ICBM force,
because of increases in both numbers and capabilities, 39 poses a greater threat
to the United States than it did at the time of the signing of the ABM Treaty.
14
The United States could argue that the failure of arms control and the corre-
sponding improvement in Soviet offensive power has undercut the strategic
equality between the superpowers. America based its acceptance of the ABM
Treaty upon the doctrine of MAD. 14 1 Inequality in strategic arms deployment
renders MAD obsolete. 42 Without the premise of MAD, the United States
obligation not to deploy prohibited missile defenses becomes dangerously un-
realistic.'4 3 Supporters of the Treaty do not consider the failure to limit offensive
weapons a fundamental change of circumstances, since both sides have partici-
pated in the arms race and have remained in rough parity.' 44
unless:
(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations
still to be performed under the treaty ....
Vienna Convention, supra note 134, art. LXII, para. 1.
137. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
138. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, Preamble. See Parkerson, supra note 6, at 126.
139. See G. KEYWORTH, SECURITY AND STABILITY: THE ROLE FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE 3 (1985).
Brzezinski, Jastrow & Kampelman, Defense in Space is not Star Wars, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1985, §6 (Magazine), at 28, 29.
140. Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard
Perle stated:
It is true that in 1972 the Soviet Union possessed no credible capability to destroy
a significant portion of the U.S. ICBM force in a pre-emptive strike. At present,
however, the Soviet force of SS-18 Mod 4's alone has the capability to threaten
a significant percentage of the U.S. ICBM force. U.S. ICBMs, on the other
hand, have no comparable capability to threaten the prompt destruction of the
Soviet land-based ballistic missile force.
Soviet Treaty Violations: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (Feb. 20, May 7, 1985), at 50 [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
141. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
142. Note that an American nuclear policy shift away from MAD in favor of strategic defense is
not in itself a fundamental change of circumstances. The change must be in objective conditions
so that a state cannot alter a factor that lies soley within its control to justify a treaty
withdrawal under art. LXII. See I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 107 (1973) and Gross, supra note 106, at 59.
143. This view holds that the asymmetry in U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities invites Soviet
nuclear risk-taking, since the U.S.'s lack of strategic defense reduces the credibility of U.S.
deterrence. See M. DEANE, STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN SOVIET STRATEGY 114 (1980).
144. The MX and Midgetman missile systems as well as the hardening of ICBM silos exemplify
U.S. responses to Soviet nuclear expansion and the maintenance of strategic equality with the
Soviet Union. See Gross, supra note 106, at 59.
The degree of parity between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces is difficult to determine because
the countries utilize different nuclear weapon delivery systems. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON STRATEGIC FORCES, SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT II at 4 (1984). The Carter
Current Treaty Arrangements
Beyond the failure to limit offensive nuclear weapons, another possible
"fundamental change" that has occurred since the signing of the ABM Treaty
is the recent development of laser and other advanced technologies. 45 The Treaty's
specific provisions for future advances in technology'4 make it unlikely that the
U.S. can characterize the emergence of exotic space weapon technology as "not
foreseen by the parties," as required by the change of circumstances doctrine.
47
Moreover, the increased attractiveness and feasibility of ballistic missile defense
brought about by new technology does not in itself radically transform the United
States obligation not to deploy strategic defense systems. 4
Another relevant international law principal concerns the right to terminate
a treaty based on a breach of a treaty obligation. 149 Due to the absence of an
effective international legal system, the threat of withdrawal for breach is the
only means by which parties can ensure that their treaties will be observed. 50 In
order to promote stability in international agreements, international law limits
the doctrine to withdrawal for material breach only. Article LX of the Vienna
Convention defines material breach as "a violation of a provision essential to





In 1984, the United States government determined that the radar at Kras-
noyarsk in central Siberia violated the ABM Treaty.5 2 Yet, despite this finding,
the radar installation does not necessarily constitute a material breach that would
allow the United States to terminate the Treaty. Because the ABM Treaty attempts
to prevent a nationwide ballistic missile defense system in which radar plays an
integral part, the provision of the Treaty banning radar (Agreed Statement F) is
"essential to the accomplishment of the object or the purpose of the treaty";
therefore, a breach of Statement F would constitute a material breach."' However,
the Treaty does allow radar for satelite tracking'5 4, and the intended use of the
Krasnoyarsk radar is disputed. 5
Administration determined that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had comparable strategic power.
H. BROWN, DEP'T OF DEF. FISCAL YEAR 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1982). Only two years later
the Reagan Administration maintained that ". . . the Soviets have aquired a margin of nuclear
superiority in most important categories." C. WEINBERGER, DEP'T OF DEF. FISCAL YEAR 1984
ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1984).
145. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
146. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, Agreed Statement D.
147. Vienna Convention, supra note 134, art. LXII, para 1.
148. Note, Star Wars Meets the ABM Treaty: The Treaty Termination Controversy, supra note
115, at 721.
149. Vienna Convention, supra note 134, art. LX, para. 1. For a review of the withdrawal for
material breach doctrine, see B. SINHA, UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF
PRIOR VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTY 5, 34 (1966).
150. See 2 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 255 (1966).
151. Vienna Convention, supra note 134, art. LX, para. 3.
152. The President's Unclassified Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control
Agreements, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 140, at 21.
153. ABM supporters assert that the Krasnoyarsk radar violates the express language of the Treaty,
but the radar is only of marginal importance. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, The
President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 264, 275 (1985).
154. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, Agreed Statement D.
155. The Soviet Union maintains that it intends to use the Krasnoyarsk radar only for satellite
tracking. A Central Intelligence Agency study that concluded that the installation was not well
designed to serve as an antiballistic missile radar supports this contention. See Gordon, CIA
is Skeptical that New Soviet Radar is Part of an ABM Defense System, NAT. J. 523, 526
(Mar. 9, 1985). But see Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1988, at 20, col. 1.
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Although the Krasnoyarsk radar may be a technical violation of the Treaty,
the United States, in order to confer legitimacy on its actions, should base its
case for abrogation on blatant and unequivocal Soviet violations.15 6 Due to the
complexities and consequences of determining material Treaty violations, the
United States has chosen not to use the Krasnoyarsk radar situation as grounds
for termination of its Treaty obligations.
When applied to the ABM Treaty, neither the right to terminate a treaty
for material breach nor the doctrine of changed circumstances offers an indis-
putable reason to abrogate. Using these international law doctrines to supplement
the withdrawal provisions of the Treaty, 5 7 the United States can legally withdraw
from the ABM Treaty. However, this is an extremely limited conclusion, since
termination of the ABM Treaty, while legal, may have a chilling effect on U.S.-
Soviet relations and impair the United States overall reputation as a treaty
partner.
Although the United States might legally terminate the ABM Treaty under
international law, neither domestic nor international law indicates which branch
of the United States government has the authority to abrogate the Treaty. The
Constitution, while designating the Executive and the Senate as the treaty-making
institutions,5 8 does not state which branch has the power to terminate treaties.
Moreover, the dual nature of a treaty-it functions as both an agreement with
a foreign country and a law of the United States-means that termination must
be effective both internationally and domestically. Clearly, the President, with
the approval of two thirds of the Senate, can terminate the domestic and foreign
status of the ABM Treaty. The widespread support of the arms control process
and the controversial nature of SDI, however, make a congressional mandate
against the ABM Treaty unlikely. The issue of whether the President, acting
alone, can abrogate the Treaty becomes increasingly important as SDI progresses
to the advanced research and deployment stage.
Constitutional scholars have long debated the issue of treaty termination.' 9
Those against unilateral presidential termination of treaties emphasize the histor-
ical role of Congress in taking such action. 60 Since treaties are the law of the
United States, treaty abrogation by the President alone usurps the lawmaking
authority of Congress and blurs the separation of powers.' 61 Proponents of the
President's authority contend that the power to terminate treaties is part of the
156. Gross, supra note 106, at 54.
157. ABM Treaty, supra note 7, art. XV. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
158. U. S. CONST. art. II, §2, para. 2.
159. For a brief overview of the opinions of those commentators who espouse the President's
unilateral treaty termination power, see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG.
2D SESS., MATERIALS ON TERMINATION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF
POWER, reprinted in M. GLENNON & T. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
VOLUME II 378-79 (1980). For a discussion of those experts who assert that legislative partici-
pation is needed to terminate a treaty see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG.
lST SESS., REPORT OF THE COMUrTTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, reprinted in M. GLENNON & T.
FRANCK, supra at 432-33.
160. Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recognition of
the Republic of China, 19 HARv. INT'L L.J. 931, 1008 (1978). See also E. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 115 (1917).




President's plenary power to conduct foreign relations.1 62 In the absence of
express constitutional limitations on the President's power to terminate trea-
ties,"there is a strong presumption that no such limitation was intended."'
63
Charlton v. Kelly'64 provides some guidance in this unsettled area of consti-
tutional law. In Charlton, the plaintiff alleged that Italian Government violations
of the U.S.-Italy extradition treaty invalidated the treaty.' 6 The Supreme Court
concluded that since the executive department waived its right to terminate the
treaty, it remained in force.' 66 The Court recognized the President's power to
unilaterally determine the status of a treaty that another party had violated.'
67
The Charlton case supports a President's power to unilaterally terminate the
ABM Treaty, only for a withdrawal based upon a Soviet breach' 68 or a funda-
mental change of circumstances.
69
The presidential power recognized in Charlton differs markedly from the
power to affirmatively terminate a validly binding international agreement, such
as the ABM Treaty. The Supreme Court recently refused to decide a case involving
such an affirmative termination. In 1978 President Jimmy Carter, acting without
legislative consent, notified the Republic of China that the United States was
withdrawing from a defense treaty between the two nations. 70 President Carter
wanted to end the treaty not as a result of any treaty violations, but as a step
toward the recognition of the Beijing government. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-
Ariz.) led the congressional challenge against the President's unilateral action. In
Goldwater v. Carter,7' justiciability problems prevented the Court from allocating
the treaty termination power.
72
Without a judicial determination on the merits of the case, the mutual
defense treaty's one-year notice period closed without withdrawal of the notice
of termination and President Carter achieved his objective. Despite the fact that
Goldwater did not settle the treaty termination controversy, President Carter's
actions provide a strong precedent for unilateral executive termination of treaties
that contain express provisions for termination through notice.
73
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165. 229. U.S. at 452-53.
166. Id. at 476.
167. See Scheffer, supra note 161, at 988.
168. See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
170. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, 6
U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213 (entered into force March 3, 1955). Article
X contains the withdrawal provision: "This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either
Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party."
171. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
172. For a detailed discusion, see Note, Executive Action, Goldwater v. Carter, and the Allocation
of the Treaty Termination Power, 15 GA. L. REV. 176 (1980-81).
173. Id. at,177. Nbte that the ABM Treaty in article XV provides for termination through notice.




Although many critics argue that SDI violates the spirit of the ABM Treaty,
most analysts of SDI's international legal implications agree that the United
States has not yet breached any international agreement. While future events may
disprove the Reagan Administration's "broad" interpretation of the Treaty,
continued development of SDI will almost certainly place the United States in
violation of several specific ABM Treaty provisions discussed above. Depending
upon the course of SDI research, the program may conflict with certain other
international accords which prohibit, among other things, the testing of nuclear-
based weapons systems or weapons designed to destroy satelites. To avoid these
diplomatic difficulties, the United States may desire to modify or even to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty; the Treaty specifically permits both these options. A final
option is outright repudiation of the Treaty. However, the cost of such a move
in terms of U.S. credibility as a treaty partner may simply be too great.
Furthermore, if the Senate refuses to support such action, it is doubtful that the
President is constitutionally empowered to act alone. As the viability of MAD
wanes and newer theories of deterrence become prominent, which rely heavily
on missile defense, it seems inevitable that the tension between the ABM Treaty
and SDI goals will continue to grow.
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